It is likely that Calfurnio would have numbered the Donat in this same company of basic books that taught Latin falsely. Indeed the Donat may very well be what he meant by "foolish primers" (insulsa rudimenta). Although deeply ingrained in the traditional curriculum, the Donat proved problematical for many humanist teachers. At first they complained primarily about its style -- limping prose stuffed with odd words, many of them medieval and not classical. This general concern had motivated the work of Guarino and Perotti. (66) Later teachers also criticized Ianua as too difficult for beginners to understand. This change in critique probably reflects the changing way the Donat was used in the classroom. Medieval students had parroted the verses mechanically to start with and then in a second part of the course repeated them with their teacher's explication, for comprehension. The first humanists seemed to have accepted this standard method, merely chafing a little at the bad Latin that embodied it. Later humanist masters took a more integrated approach to teaching Latin; they wanted their students to learn simple, pure classical vocabulary from the start, and they did not want them to begin with an ill-comprehended text. Only if students could recognize the meaning of the text immediately could they eventually come to love the language. Robert Black sees this humanist ideal contributing to the increasing marginalization of the Donat and its relegation to the reading course; he cites as evidence the increasing number of humanist grammars after 1480 that include basic paradigms that once were learned only with the Donat. (67) At least one sixteenth-century humanist, Stefano Piazzoni (dates unknown), made a concerted effort to correct the Donat and provide it with better declensional paradigms. He seems to have had his own students in Venice in mind. (68)
Giovanni Sulpizio (1450-ca 1513), by contrast, accepted the entrenched place of the Donat and simply created a corrective Latin grammar to follow immediately upon it. Sulpizio probably intended his work to be called Opus grammaticum, but it circulated under several other titles, most often just Regulae Sulpitii. It was often printed together with the author's work on prosody (commonly Scansiones Sulpitii) and the two works in effect cover an entire intermediate Latin grammar course. Sulpizio expressly said his book was to be given to students right after the Donat; but he assumed that they have little understanding of the inflectional paradigms. He did not give the students new paradigms to memorize, but he rehearsed the definitions of the parts of speech in an introductory poem to be memorized and then explained the regular structure of inflected forms at length. He also provided long lists of irregular forms to be memorized. In other words, he was repeating some basic material from the rote-memorized Donat but insisting it be thoroughly understood through repeated, intelligent drilling. Sulpizio made extensive use of mnemonic verses so the rules would be easier to digest. Although the book is presented in a format confusing to modern readers, with repeated prefaces, inserted passages from earlier grammarians, short reading texts, and irregular headings, it was popular with humanist teachers for its wealth of drilling materials. One of the reading texts, Sulpizio's own poem on table manners, was widely excerpted and anthologized by other authors. (69)
It is possible that many teachers used Sulpizio more as a source book or teaching auxiliary than as a basic textbook. Giovanni Tacuino printed the two works in an unusual format in 1495, with the title Regulae Sulpitii on an otherwise blank front page and Scansione Sulpitii on the corresponding back page, effectively creating a paper wrapper for the two books if purchased and bound together. Such packaging rather effectively labels the book as work of reference. (70) Later editions styled Sulpizio's grammar accurately enough as a Grammaticae compendium. In this form the book included a chapter on the figures of speech lifted directly from Aelius Donatus' Ars maior (and attributed to him), as well as the De scansione. Sometimes the parts were pulled apart again and issued in editions designed to accompany each other. The full anthology had many editions across fifty years in Italy and was used in Northern Europe as well. (71)
Sulpizio's basic strategy -- accept the traditional Donat as unavoidable, but correct it immediately -- was adopted by many authors across the sixteenth century. But not all teachers found Sulpizio's multiplication of examples and drills a wise procedure. In Milan in 1599, Alessandro Rubini at Milan rejected several grammars then on the market and proposed his own De grammaticis insitutionibus liber. Even at this late date, he assumed his students would have memorized the Donat. His follow-up grammar gave a very limited number of clear, simple rules with a single example for each, "lest the weak minds of boys be overwhelmed by a multitude of examples." (72) From this stage, they would go on to memorize additional rules and examples, or better yet to apply them directly in reading and construing proverbs and moral sayings.
This practical development, denigrating the Donat by marginalizing it and minimizing its influence, was paralleled in the rhetoric of humanist teachers, who increasingly condemned the way in which the Donat supposedly destroyed any possible enjoyment of or appreciation for the Latin language. In the context of just such an exhortation to make Latin admirable to beginners, Francesco Priscianese (1495-1549) recommended his own short introductory grammar as a substitute for the Donat:
And the Donat too (to speak freely the truth and what, as I believe, every good man would say who had thought about it for a while) is far too dry a thing for real beginners, and too weak, and (what is most important) too difficult, both for its language, which no one understands without a translator, and also for the material treated in difficult fashion, out of order, and strangely. So much so that one can almost say that he who knows the Donat, unless he already knew a great deal of what he now knows beforehand, knows nothing at all, or rather that if he does know something, does not know what he knows. (73)
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